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This study is an attempt at solving the chronic problems of banking murabaha, notably the ribawi
benchmark rate problem. To this end, the first stage of this study examines whether the recent solution
for banking murabaha, namely Islamic Interbank Benchmark Rate (IIBR), is a sustainable solution to
solve the problem, particularly in Indonesia. Using data covering the 1210-day period from November 14th, 2011 (the first date emergence of IIBR) to July 1st, 2016, the Johansen cointegration test
between IIBR and JIBOR (Jakarta Interbank Offered Rate) is performed to prove that notion. The results suggest that IIBR has long-run equilibrium relationship with the Indonesian ribawi benchmark
rate. IIBR hence does not fulfil the sustainability feature as a long-run solution for Islamic finance.
The second stage of this study proposes the so-called universal Islamic banking system as a solution
to remedy the problem. The proposed model is not only theoretically appealing but also practically
possible to be implemented.
Keywords: Islamic Banking; Banking Murabaha; Islamic Interbank Benchmark Rate; Cointegration;
Universal Banking System
JEL classification: G21; C24

Introduction
To date, banking murabaha has become the
most utilised Islamic product employed by Islamic Banks (IBs) over the world. The practice
is however different from that of the classic
one. Accounting and Auditing Organisation for
Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) (2007:
134) defines banking murabaha as
“a sale in which two parties or more negotiate and promise each other to execute
an agreement according to which the orderer [client] asks the purchaser [IB] to
purchase an asset of which the latter will

take legal possession. The orderer [client]
promises the purchaser [IB] to purchase the
asset from him and give the ordered a profit
thereon. The two parties would conclude a
sale after the possession of the ordered to
the asset. However, the purchase order may
or may not be obliged to conclude the sale.”
The main difference between the two is located in the way banking murabaha priced in
the financial market instead of the real market.
It is the case that almost all IBs utilise interest based (i.e. ribawi) benchmark rate such as
LIBOR (or JIBOR for the local case of Indonesia) to determine their profit mark-up in order to
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provide more competitive rate with its conventional counterpart (Khan, 2010). Some scholars
tolerate the application of ribawi benchmark
rate in banking murabaha pricing for the following reasons. First, Islamic finance institutions are inevitably in need with the common
reference to integrate with international capital
market (Azmat et al., 2015). Second, mainstream banks involved in the business need a
pricing mechanism equivalent to that in conventional one. Finally, it is utilised for the sake of
making Islamic banks more competitive (Iqbal,
1999: 47). Those arguments received Shari’ah
support from Usmani (2002) who advances an
analogy to justify the practice from a religious
perspective.
Having said that, Usmani also opposes the
employment of ribawi benchmark rate for the
long-term Islamic finance development. That
is, the practice should only be done in the early
development stage of Islamic finance. In the
long-term, Islamic finance must depart from the
practice; employ unique pricing method based
on its fundamental values. Accordingly, many
scholars encourage development of Islamic
benchmarks as the surrogate. Haque & Mirakhor (1998) propose a macro-level index model
and Iqbal (1999) adapts a micro-level strategy
to construct the benchmark by extending Mirakhor (1996) using the Tobin’s q approach.
Among others, however, the most employed
one is the Islamic Interbank Benchmark Rate
(IIBR) launched by Thomson Reuters in cooperation with AAOIFI (Reuters, 2011).
Even though the solution of IIBR might
seem practically appealing, the study pertaining to what extent the solution is effective to
fulfil the aim as replacement of ribawi benchmark rate needs to be done. If the IIBR, eventually, still fails to do its role, the next plausible
question is what is the more appropriate solution for this matter? This paper, therefore, tries
to fulfil those gaps in the scope of Indonesia.
In the first stage, this paper aims at examining whether IIBR is the appropriate solution to
cope the problem arise in the ribawi benchmark
rate of murabaha contract in Indonesia. In the
second stage, this paper proposes the more sustainable way to overcome the benchmark rate
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problem of murabaha contract in Indonesian
IBs. The solution is supposed to accommodate
the uniqueness of Islamic finance in which not
only the Shari’ah form but also its substance,
including embeddedness to the real sector of
economy, is incorporated.
In doing so, this paper firstly examines the
long-run cointegration relationship between
IIBR and ribawi benchmark rate JIBOR (Jakarta Interbank Offered Rate). The gist of this test
is to prove whether IIBR move independently
apart from the conventional benchmark JIBOR
or otherwise. Secondly, if the so-called Islamic
benchmark rate and ribawi benchmarks rate are
cointegrated, the IIBR is not sustainably coping the problem arise from the employment of
ribawi benchmark rate for murabaha contract.
This paper proposes the so-called Universal Islamic banking (UIB) system as the architecture
Islamic banking, particularly in Indonesia as
the sustainable solution.

Literature Review
The so called “banking murabaha”
In the 1970s, Islamic banking firstly emerged
with the concept of Mohammad Uzair’s “twotier mudharaba” as its institutional model (Vogel & Hayes, 1998). The model is supposed to
be greatly relying on the equity based (profitloss sharing) financing with embedded growth
and stability arguments in the assets and liabilities sides, respectively (Ahmed, 2011). However, that ideal model did not work in practice
due to various complicated problems such as
unsupported countries’ legal and law, higher
risk, uncertainty of return, higher monitoring
cost, and lack of knowledge (Ahmed, 2011; Vogel & Hayes, 1998). Some adjustments, thus,
were considered to make Islamic banking more
true-to-life and competitive to its conventional
counterpart. Those endeavours then yielded
the concept of “Murabaha to the Purchase Ordered” (commonly called as Banking murabaha) which was proposed by 1987 IDB prize laureate, Dr. Sami Hamoud in 1976 (Kahf, 2013).
That concept became a token to the beginning
of the one-tier mudharaba or murabaha syn-
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Figure 1. Financing Composition of Islamic Banking in Indonesia between 2004 and March
2017

Source: Indonesian Islamic Banking Statistics, OJK (2004, 2010, and March 2017)

drome era in Islamic banking, which mainly dependent with the banking murabaha contract.
In Indonesia, the first Islamic bank (IB) was
established in 1992 following the concept of
one-tier mudharaba as mentioned earlier. This
can be viewed from the growth of financing
composition of murabaha product in the Indonesian IB as shown by Figure 1. The figure
shows that murabaha has been the main product for IB in Indonesia since the beginning of its
emergence. Although attempts to diversify the
financing activities into other form of contracts
such as musharaka has been appearing, murabaha contract was still accounted for more than
half of financing composition of IB by March
2017, i.e. 56.1 per cent.
In practice, some divergences take place in
the way IBs operate the murabaha contract. For
instance, the most highlighted one is the case
that almost all IBs utilise ribawi benchmark rate
such as LIBOR, in the international context,
and JIBOR, in the Indonesian context, to determine their profit mark-up in order to provide
more competitive rate with its conventional
counterpart. Moreover, although theoretically
IBs are supposed to own the goods’ ownership
before it is transferred to the client, practically
IBs only own the goods in the very short time.
Furthermore, even though the transfer of ownership is supposed to be done when the goods
are transferred to the buyer, IBs retain the ownership until the full payment is received so that
they always secure their position (Khan, 2010).
Provided the current practice of murabaha

banking, some scholars viciously make some
critics. Kuran (2004: 10), for instance, comments that “[f]rom an economic standpoint, of
course, an infinitesimal ownership period makes
murabaha equivalent to an interest-based loan:
the bank bears no risk, and the client pays for
the time-value of money. There remains merely
a semantic difference, which is that the client’s
payment is called a ‘service charge’ or ‘markup’ in one case and ‘interest’ in the other.” He
further asserts that the fallacy also appears in
the way IBs give no penalty for late payment,
since it is prohibited; instead, they incorporate
the penalty charge in the advance payment, in
which they charge higher advance payment and
offer rebate for payment on time. Thus, Kuran
sizes up that the “[banking] murabaha differs
only cosmetically from the interest-based financing practices of the merchant banks and
trading firms of the West” (Kuran, 2004: 10).
In particular, with regard to those issues
mentioned by Kuran, scholars put extensively
high concern in the way IBs use ribawi benchmark rate in determining mark-up for murabaha contract. On the one hand, some scholars
and practitioners, of course, show their tolerances to accept the application as reflected in
the following evasions. Firstly, Islamic finance
institutions are inevitably in need with the common reference to integrate with international
capital markets. Secondly, as western bank also
involved into the business, they need equivalent
rate of return to the conventional one. Finally,
ribawi benchmark rate is utilised for the sake of
103
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competition to attracting the clients (see Iqbal,
1999: 47).
On the other hand, many scholars argue the
opposite, that the ribawi benchmark is unfavourable in terms of the Shari’ah form and substance. Iqbal (1999) asserts that the practice is
completely unacceptable since the benchmark
rate does not represent the real rate of return
form the real economy, while the attachment
with real economy is the main feature of Islamic
finance. On the same side, El-Gamal (2007) affirms that the practice is not an appropriate pace
for development of Islamic finance irrespective
of many scholars who stand on the approval of
using conventional benchmark rate to determine banking murabaha profit. He rebuts the
justification of ribawi benchmark rate through
following prepositions.
First, according to El-Gamal, the analogy
mentioned by Usmani (2002) is fallacious.
Usmani maintains that given A is a seller of liquor, which is definitely prohibited in Islam, and
B is a seller of soft drink, which is permissible.
If, say, B desires to get the same profit as A.
B then may charge his customer with the same
rate of profit with A. If it is the case, it does not
necessarily lead the trade of B becomes forbidden as that of A. The analogy is incorrect since
the object of sale in IBs do not practically differ
from that of conventional banks as how liquor
and soft drink do. In terms of mortgage, for instance, the input of both entities are the same,
such as cost of funds; credit risk; and collateral
property risk, and the output is also the same,
which is a debt on the customer equal to the
price of the property plus the additional banks
cost of funds.
Second, this practice locates Islamic banking in the position which is fully dependent
with the conventional one for its existence, nature of the product, and rate of return. It thus
may lead to the sceptical view of customers toward IBs products, whether or not the product
fully complies to the Shari’ah in terms of form
and substance. If the conventional product is
extensively prohibited by Islam, why then IBs
benchmark to the conventional interest rate?
Finally, the benchmarking rate practice does
not reflect the asset-based nature of Islamic fi-
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nance. As El-Gamal also points out that “Islamic model… should do more than merely camouflage a conventional mortgage loan through
sales, leases, and the like. It should provide the
customer with appropriate tools for determining whether or not the purchase of a particular
property at a particular price and financing that
purchase at a particular interest rate constitute
a good investment or financial decision” (ElGamal, 2006: 76).
According to the above discussions, it is
well-earned if the practice of banking murabaha is judged as a ‘dishonesty and deception being practice in the name of Islam’ in the notion
of Saleem (2005), ‘rent-seeking Shari’ah arbitrage’ in that of El-Gamal (2007), ‘jurisprudential schizophrenia’ in that of Hamoudi (2007),
‘legal hypocrisy’ and ‘thinly veiled of [interestbased debt]’ in that of Holden (2007), simply
‘disguised interest’ in that of Khan (2010), and
containing ‘vapours of riba’ in the terminology
of Ebrahim and Shaikh (2016).
Symptoms of reputational risks in Indonesian
IBs
Needless to say, as the main mode of financing of Islamic finance so far, IBs imply
some very unique risks apart from its conventional counterparts. In this regard, IBs obviously need to consider the embedded fiduciary
risk of their business. Majority of the customers chose IBs as their mode of financing since
they offer Shari’ah based transaction in which
their businesses are at least free from riba and
excessive gharar, which are definitely prohibited by Shari’ah (El-Gamal, 2006). Negligence
of incorporating this obligatory feature in the
murabaha product of IBs as mentioned earlier
may lead to reputational risk which may eventually end with long-run development problem
of Islamic finance (Ahmed, 2014). Thus, if IBs
failed to maintain their customers’ trusts, they
will be inevitably abandoned.
The symptoms of this currently can be observed from the Indonesian IBs performance.
Enjoying the extensive growth of the total assets and financing over the years until 2011, the
baby industry now has been facing the sluggish
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Figure 2. Growth of Aggregate Total Assets Islamic and Conventional Banks Financing
2006 and 2016

Source: Indonesian Islamic Banking Statistics, OJK (2010 and March 2017) and Indonesian Banking Statistics, OJK (2010 and March 2017)

growth since afterwards. Figure 2 clearly shows
how does this fact take place. IBs has been savouring extensive growth of total assets between 2006 and 2011 in which the growth has
been accounted for 38.40 per cent in average,
compared to its conventional counterpart which
has been experiencing only 16.44 per cent average total assets growth in the same period.
Accordingly, many people then were confident
that this industry will have even better performance in the future. However, the hegemony
was stopped after 2011 when the growth of IBs
total assets has been decreasing overtime. The
nethermost position was happening in 2014
and 2015 in which the growth of IBs were even
lower than its conventional counterparts. Those
discussions eventually put the sustainability of
Islamic banking under very big questions.
Therefore, some innovations are inevitably
needed in order to cope the problem of benchmark pricing in the murabaha contract through
which the reputational risk can be avoided and
the sustainability can be promoted.
The so-called Islamic benchmark rate
It is worth to note that scholars who permit
the benchmark rate pricing for murabaha, such
as Usmani (2002), also acknowledge the risk
of employing the same in the long-term development of Islamic finance. Usmani (2002: 49)
maintains that “[i]t is, however true that Islamic
banks and financial institutions should get rid

of this practice as soon as possible, because,
firstly, it takes the rate of interest as an ideal
for halal business which is not desirable, and
secondly because it does not advance the basic
philosophy of Islamic economy having no impact on the system distribution.”
Some attempts have been done to develop
the so-called Islamic benchmark rate. Haque
and Mirakhor (1998) propose economy-wide
index model in order to addressed the absence
of Islamic benchmark rate. They argue that
the rate of return to financial assets should be
determined by the rate of return of real sector
of economy. In doing so, rate of return on the
so-called ‘national participation paper’ must be
constructed from the both international stock
market index and domestic market performance
indicators. Unlike Haque & Mirakhor who harness the macro-level approach, Iqbal (1999)
utilises micro-level approach to construct the
benchmark through extending the work of Mirakhor (1996) based on the Tobin’s q theory of
investment. His idea is, since the cost of capital
in the Islamic finance cannot be reflected with
interest rate as in the conventional one, it can be
deputised by rate of return of other investment
with the comparable risk. Thus, cost of capital
is supposed to be a function of firm’s Tobin’s q
ratio which is a ratio of market to replacement
value of capital.
Furthermore, the more practically appealing
way of dealing with this problem came from
Thomson Reuters in co-operation with AAOIFI
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which in 2011 launched the Islamic Interbank
Benchmark Rate (IIBR) (Reuters, 2011). IIBR
is a daily basis rate reflected the average of, at
least, 18 international contributor panel IBs’
cost of funding. The average is calculated after
excluding 25 per cent of top and bottom quartiles of the distribution. The rate is arguably independent form the LIBOR, and even JIBOR,
since it is constructed based on the profit rate of
the IBs instead of interest rate, even though the
calculation methodology of them is very similar. Furthermore, since the rate is always updated every day, it addresses the low frequency
problem of rate calculation based on the real
economic indicators as, for instance, suggested
by Haque and Mirakhor and Iqbal.
However, as the pricing method is still conducted in the financial sector of the economy, it
is inevitable to suspect the possibility of similar
movement between IIBR as the Islamic benchmark index and JIBOR as the ribawi one as
proven in the international context by Jatmiko
et al. (2017). This definitely can nullify the independent argument of the Islamic benchmark
rate. We discuss this in the next section of this
study.

Research Methods
Johansen cointegration test is utilised in
order to examine the long-run relationship between IIBR and ribawi benchmark rate JIBOR.
Johansen technique is chosen due to its advantages compared to other techniques such as the
Engle-Granger 2-step method and the EngleYoo 3-step method. As clearly mentioned by
Brooks (2008), since Johansen is utilised on the
framework of Vector Auto Regression (VAR)
technique, it strips the problem of simultaneous
equation bias which may appear in the other
techniques. In addition, unlike the others, Johansen test also allows this study to perform
hypothesis test of the cointegrating relationship. However, it is worth to note that, Johansen
test is very much affected by the lag length chosen as it is conducted on the VAR’s framework.
Thus, the attempt to select the lag length opti1

mality is crucial in this matter (Brooks, 2008).
To perform Johansen cointegration test, fist,
this study ensures that the variables used are
I(1) through performing Augmented DickeyFuller (ADF) and Philips Perron (PP) unit root
tests. Second, after ensuring the variable are
I(1), this paper utilises the lag length optimal
test to choose the right lag length for the model
using the Schwarz Information Criterion (SC).
Finally, this paper performs Johansen hypothesis testing after observing the right deterministic trend assumption of the test via graphic analysis1. The test is done by calculating the rank of
long-run coefficient matrix via its eigenvalues.
Then the hypothesis is evaluated by using trace
and Max-Eigenvalue as following.
λtrace(r)=-T

ln(1- i)

(1)

and
λmax(r,r+1)=-T ln(1-

)

r+1

(2)

where T is the number of observations (series), r is the number of cointegrating vectors
under the null hypothesis and i is the estimated
value for the i the ordered eigenvalue from the
long-run coefficient matrix.
The difference between the two test is; λtrace
is a joint test which has a null hypothesis that
the number of cointegrating vectors is less than
or equal to r against an unspecified or general
alternative which is more than r itself. On the
other hand, the λmax is a separate test where the
the number of cointegrating vectors is r against
an r+1 alternative hypothesis. The hypothesis
for λmax then as the following.
H0:r = 0 Vs. H1:0 < r ≤ g
H0:r = 1 Vs. H1:1 < r ≤ g
H0:r = g − 1 Vs. H1:r < r ≤ g
If one does not reject the first hypothesis
testing, thus it means there is no cointegrating
vectors on the model. In contrast, if one rejects

Due to limitation of space, the graphical analysis is not presented in the paper yet available upon request.
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Table 1. Unit Root Test
IIBR
Maturities
ON
1-WEEK
1-MONTH
3-MONTH
6-MONTH
1-YEAR

LEVEL
-2.31
-2.41
-2.38
-1.45
-1.41
-1.45

JIBOR
DIFF
-11.15***
-11.51***
-9.91***
-12.01***
-11.07***
-10.48***

LEVEL
-1.43
-1.53
-0.94
-0.88
-0.81
-0.78

DIFF
-17.39***
-18.80***
-25.00***
-18.34***
-28.40***
-28.26***

The numbers represent the t-statistics for the series in the level and first-difference. ***,** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.

Table 2. Optimum Lag Length Test
Maturities
ON
1-WEEK
1-MONTH
3-MONTH
6-MONTH
1-YEAR

Opt. Lags
4
7
3
3
2
2

IIBR - JIBOR
Intercept
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

Det. Trend
Lin. with Trend
Lin. No Trend
Lin. No Trend
Lin. No Trend
Lin. No Trend
Lin. No Trend

Opt. stands for optimum while Detd. stands for deterministic

the first hypothesis testing means there is at
least one cointegrating vector in the model and
then the test is supposed to be continued for the
model that has more than two variables.

Results and Discussions
Re-examining the sustainability of IIBR
This section examines whether there is a
long-run relationship (cointegration) between
the so called Islamic benchmark rate IIBR and
JIBOR. If IIBR can bring the ideal of its advocates, the rate is supposed to be independent
and linked with the real sector. The Johansen
cointegration test allows to verify this; the rate
is arguably not independent if it has long-run
equilibrium with the ribawi benchmark rates
JIBOR.
Data and unit root test
The data used in this paper is obtained from
datastream and covers the period from November 14th, 2011 (the first date emergence of IIBR)
to July 1st, 2016. However due to an issue pertaining to structural break of the data this paper only examines the period between April
16th, 2012 and May 5th, 2016. Furthermore,
this paper utilises all available maturities, i.e.

overnight (ON), one-week, one-month, threemonth, six-month and one-year.
Table 1 shows the unit root test of every
series using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
method and Schwarz Information Criterion
(SC) for the selection of maximum lags. The
table depicts that both series (IIBR and JIBOR)
across all maturities are I(1) at the level. It is
shown by the fact that all the series have no unit
root [1(0)] at the first difference level. Thus all
the data are eligible to be utilised in the Johansen cointegration test.
Optimum lag length
This paper uses Schwarz Information Criterion (SC) to choose the most optimum lag
for every model as shown in the Table 2. The
optimum lag lengths vary across the maturities
from the lowest 2nd (second) to the highest 7th
(sixth) lag. The same table also summarize the
deterministic trend assumption for the model.
Based on its deterministic trend assumption, the
Johansen test can be divided into five different
types of assumption regarding to the kind of
trend, namely none; linear; and quadratic, the
present of intercept and the present of trend.
This study uses the graphic analysis in order to
determine the assumption and yields that almost
all of the IIBR – JIBOR models are following
107
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quadratic trend, while those of the IIBR – JIBOR models are following the linear without
trend assumption.
Cointergation between the series
The Johansen cointegration test is then utilised for IIBR and JIBOR as shown in Table 3.
It is worth to note that, this paper negates the
Friday observation due to holiday in the Middle
East market on that day so that the mis-match
bias can be reduced. However, the un-reported
result with the Friday observation shows no
significant differences with the presented result.
Table 3 implies that the cointegration realtionship exists between the IIBR and ribawi
global benchmark, LIBOR. It is shown by all
the Trace and Max-Eigen value of the model
significantly reject the first null-hypothesis at 1
per cent for every maturity: overnight; 1-month;
3-month; 6-month; or 1-year, with exception to
the 1-week maturity. This result, thus, shows
that that IIBR does not significantly address the
problem of ribawi benchmark rate. It further
implies that the IIBR is, at least in the long-run,
not independent from JIBOR. In consequence,
this dilutes the main end of the Islamic benchmark rate proposal, which is de-linking the Islamic banking pricing to the conventional one.
This study is aware of the contra result coming from previous study, Azmad & Ahsan (2014)
[presented in the Islamic Banking & Finance
2014 Programme, Lancaster University, UK],
which report no long-run relationship between
the IIBR and LIBOR. However, it in no way
vitiates this study’s results because of the following arguments. First, this study has accommodated all the features Azmad & Ahsan have
in their study, including taking into account the
structural break and the exclusion of Friday observation due to holiday in Middle East. Secondly, this study even utilises (i) more samples
and carries out (ii) more maturities, in which
the Azmad & Ahsan’s utilise only the sample
covers mid of November 2011 to end of April
2013 and exclude the two- and three-month
maturities observations. Finally, unlike Azmad
& Ahsan’s methodology, this study’s conforms
with Brooks (2008: 350-355) in terms of testing
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the observation at the level, which is I(1), instead of performing it at first difference as done
by Azmad & Ahsan’s. Furthermore, the Azmad
& Ahsan’s results have been also corrected by
Jatmiko et al. (2017) who document long-run
relationship between IIBR and LIBOR.
Moreover, the argument to avoid the use
of so-called independent Islamic benchmark
rate also comes from the international finance
perspective. This is because the implication
of the previous plea is the appearance of arbitrage opportunity between ‘Islamic’ benchmark
rate and ribawi benchmark rate. Jatmiko et al.
(2017) maintain that in almost all occasions
IIBR gives higher return than LIBOR, provided
that the two are all redenominated in the dollar currency. In consequence, rational investors
then may take advantage through short selling,
long (borrow) in the LIBOR and short (lend)
in the IIBR. However, in the long-run, the arbitrage advantage will disappear and the rate
of the two will be converge into equilibrium.
In other words, in the long-run the difference
between two will be not significantly different
with zero. From this very argument, it is safe
to say that the murabaha contract to be fully
Shari’ah-based which attached with real sector,
has to be detached from the financial market
pricing since it is supposed to be a (credit) salebased contract rather than mere synthetic loanbased contract.
Furthermore, say, as if the cointegration is
found neither in the IIBR – JIBOR relationship,
the IIBR rate still may be eligible for the global
rate utilisation only, since the rate is very much
redenominated in terms of dollar financing,
which may not appropriate to be applied for domestic market of Indonesian IBs in which the
transactions are done in the Indonesian Rupiah.
Nevertheless, say that the rate can be utilized
as the global Islamic banking rate. It is, in fact,
not that global since the contributor banks of
IIBR are coming merely from certain big banks
in the GCC country. It may reflect the realities
of liquidity in that region but may not be the
case for the other Islamic banking markets such
as that in Indonesia.
Finally, say, the rate is a valid instrument to
be utilized in the USD based and global-wide
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Table 3. Johansen Cointegration Test for IIBR – JIBOR
Hypothesis
H0: r=0
H0: r=1

Hypothesis
H0: r=0
H0: r=1

Overnight
Trace
Max-Eigen
0.04***
0.04 ***
(35.06)
(35.56)
0.00
0.00
(1.50)
(1.50)
3-month
Trace
Max-Eigen
0.02***
0.02 ***
(16.89)
(15.24)
0.00
0.00
(1.65)
(1.65)

1-week
Trace
0.01
(13.73)
0.00
(1.20)

Max-Eigen
0.01
(12.53)
0.00
(1.20)

6-month
Trace
Max-Eigen
0.02 ***
0.02 ***
(22.45)
(22.31)
0.00
0.00
(2.14)
(2.14)

1-month
Trace
Max-Eigen
0.02 ***
0.02 ***
(21.02)
(19.27)
0.00
0.00
(1.75)
(1.75)
1-year
Trace
Max-Eigen
0.02 ***
0.02 ***
(18.85)
(16.77)
0.00
0.00
(2.08)
(2.08)

The numbers in the parantheses potray the critical value of Trace or Max-Eigen statistics. ***,** and * represent significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively

financing in GCC countries. In fact, the utilization of the rate in that original region, which is
GCC, are very limited after almost five years
of its existence. Ali (2013) documents that even
the primary GCC banks, including those which
become contributors of the IIBR, are lack of
confidence to harness the rate as a benchmark
for their USD based financing.
In summary, IIBR is not an effective solution to cope the problem of ribawi benchmarking rate of murabaha banking, particularly in
Indonesia. Therefore, this study proposes the
more Universal solution for this matter as will
be presented in the following sections.
The so-called Universal Islamic banking system: a proposal
In the second stage, this paper proposes the
so-called a Universal Islamic banking system
as a general solution for the problem of IBs in
Indonesia, particularly pertaining to the murabaha banking activities. The model is called
Universal since it is derived from the root of
the problem of murabaha banking itself instead
of only regarding the surface of the problems.
This also ensures the consideration of longrun development of Islamic finance in which,
although the form of Shari’ah important to be
fulfilled, focuses on the fulfilment of the substance of the Shari’ah in the model.
Before going through the model, this section
re-locates the root problem of the murabaha
banking as particular. This study argues that the
main problem of Islamic banking comes from
its departure from the equity based model to

the one-tier mudharaba model. The departure
implies the negligence of the growth argument
in the asset side of the IB in which supposedly
IB may create more growth to the economy
through its investment to the particular business
through the mudaraba or musharaka mode of
financing. Through this, the so-called clients
of the bank are not burdened with the fixed
predetermined interest rate which may restrict
their business growth. The growth can also be
achieved through the way IBs may not strictly
require the fixed collateral so that the financing
may reach broader outreach. However, indeed
one must also aware that this basic model implies higher risk in terms of involvement in the
real business as well as the less physical collateral having by banks.
The mode of financing then shifts to the
banking murabaha in which the practice has
many differences with the so-called classic
murabaha. Banking murabaha is supposed to
be sale-based transaction in which the real sell
and purchase mechanism is conducted by seller
(bank) and buyer (client). In addition, the pricing of the goods being sold is supposed to be
following the market mechanism. However,
the practice diverges from the definition of the
mode of financing. Instead, practically bank has
no ownership and directly shifts its risk of the
good into the client. The problem then becomes
even severe when the pricing model of the bank
is following the ribawi benchmark rate. Those
practices further imply detachment of IBs from
the real sector of the economy, and thus lead
IBs to be very much in conformity with their
conventional counterparts. In the end, they
109
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leave nothing in the market but the confusion
of the clients.
Since the uniqueness of IBs are gone, the
business model shares the same problem with
the conventional one or even worse. Beyond the
loss of growth argument and present of fragility
(instability) problem, the Islamic model suffers
from the business inefficiency such as the present of double taxation, higher transportation
cost, bigger carrying and warehouse cost and
also many excuses of not doing the regulatory
framework such as BASEL or national Acts.
Thus, it is plausible to consider the saying of
Ahmed (2004) that as if the difference between
Islamic and conventional banking is only about
interest-free or not, probably it would be more
efficient to let the conventional counterparts
provide Islamic service instead of build a new
institution which offers the similar product.
According to above discussions, this study
then argues that the issue of murabaha pricing
is not able to be solved by using only interestfree benchmark such as IIBR. Since the root
problem actually comes from, as mentioned,
the business model of Islamic banking per se
which shifts away from the equity based model,
and thus detached from the real sector. As “the
mode of production [i.e. IB] is employed purely
in the financial sector of economy” (Ebrahim
and Shaikh, 2016: 190), the endeavour to create
new benchmark will yield trivial impact since
it mere creates inefficient financial markets and
invites the smart money to expropriate the arbitrage opportunity. In the long run, the arbitrageurs will remedy the inefficiency and send
back the financial markets into efficient condition in which the different between ribawi and
ribawi-free benchmark rate will be not dissimilar with zero (see Granger, 1986).
The gist of the model
Therefore, this study argues the best solution is to ‘re-embedding’ back the mode of
production to the real sector through reviving
the concept of equity based model. Through
which the murabaha pricing may be priced
based on the market mechanism in which the
price is reflected by both supply and demand
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mechanism in the real sector. One way to do
this is to create the Universal Islamic bankbased financial system as proposed by Jatmiko
et al. (2017). The gist of the system is that the
IB owns the share of a merchant (trader) either
using mudharaba (non-voting rights) or musharaka (voting rights) mode of financing. While
the merchant then trades its goods on the credit
murabaha basis to the customers in the real sector of the economy and prices it according to
the both price elasticity of demand and that of
supply mechanism, instead of benchmark rate.
In this regard, IB takes the main role as the buyers’ credit risk evaluators, using the input information from the merchant, and receivables
collectors (see Figure 3).
Advantages of the model
The proposed model has some important advantages. First, the model can rightly accommodate the equity based nature of Islamic finance which may revive the growth argument
of Islamic banking. In this model, bank is not
the direct entity to perform sale-based murabaha mode of financing rather, it owns the equity
of the merchants which have credit murabaha
trading as their main business. The investment
of bank to the merchants can be of two types,
namely non-voting rights ownership using the
mudharaba kind of contract or voting rights
ownership utilising the musharaka kind of contract. It is true that the equity based financing
model is prone to higher present of agency problems (Ebrahim and Sheikh, 2015). Accordingly,
some innovations pertaining to the investment
model of IBs must be considered to reduce the
agency issues. For instance, one may consider
the hybrid contract such as preferred participating ijarah which involves various combination
of participatory component among capital appreciation, ijarah payments and income from
operation as the substitution of classic mudharaba kind of transaction (see further Ebrahim et
al., 2014).
Second, by using the model IBs can still utilise the murabaha contract through their merchants. It thus remedies some chronic issues
of banking murabaha including the ownership
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Figure 3. Universal Islamic Banking Model
Buyer
Merchant A
Buyer

Buyer

Islamic Bank

Merchant B
Buyer

Buyer
Merchant C
Buyer

This figure deputises the proposed Islamic banking architecture. The lines are described as the following.
The flow of share of the ownership
The flow of profit and loss sharing
The flow of goods at the spot
The flow of money at the deferred
Source: Jatmiko et al. (2017)

and benchmark pricing problem. The former is
address in the sense that banks no longer need
to own the traded goods by themselves, instead
the goods are purchased, owned and sold by
their merchants. The letter is solved since the
pricing model is determined by the supply and
demand mechanism. Banks may also evaluate
the optimum pricing policy through incorporating the price elasticity both from the perspective of the buyers as well as their merchants.
This solution thus implies re-embeddedness of
IBs with the real sector of the economy.
Moreover, this model also considerably
more efficient since it reduces the high cost
of economy problem. For instance, the economy with the murabaha banking model needs
the cost of acquiring a particular good as
, where PV stands for
present value, m1, m2 and c respectively represent margin for bank, supplier and price from
the producer. In the economy with this Universal Islamic banking model, the cost of acquiring
a particular good is only as TCsb =PV(m3+c), in
which m3 represents the margin charged by a
merchant under consideration of an IB where
m3 ≤ m1 + m2. This condition implies that the
Universal model is more efficient than the murabaha banking model, TCsb ≤ TCmb. The condition is held since the model implies shorter
supply chain in which the IBs do not need to
endure the transportation, inspection, carrying
cost as well as the risk of the product since the

product is already in the warehouse of their
merchant. Another way to observe the economic efficiency of the model is from the possibility
to reduce the price of the product which in turn
may increase the profit of the banks, assumed
the product are price elastic. When the price is
elastic thus the lower the price the higher the
increase in the product sold is, thus the profitability of the banks may also be increasing.
Furthermore, integration of business between IB and merchant bears the easier way to
assess the buyers’ creditworthiness, as merchant
is better evaluator and controller of its buyers’
credit risk (Petersen & Rajan, 1997: 662), and
collecting the credit, as Islamic banking have
more established collection system and network to do so. Finally, as documented by Sen
(1998), in the presence of imperfect financial
market, in which the consumer borrowing rate
is higher than the savings rate, the credit murabaha performed by merchant is more optimal than that performed by bank since it may
grab more heterogeneous customers in respect
to their intertemporal consumption preference.
The customers who are currently have lower
income than in the future will have higher marginal willingness to substitute future payment
for current payment than customers who are
currently have higher income than in the future.
Sen further argues that the cost of borrowing
offered by merchant is often lower than that offered by bank. This is also the case for this Uni-
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versal Banking system. Jatmiko et al. (2017)
mathematically proves that the murabaha price
using UIB is lower and more stable than banks
loan particularly in the period of crisis. Those
facts, eventually maintain long-term relationship between seller and buyer as well as induce
the replenishment of the demand of the goods
even higher.
Finally, this Universal Islamic banking model guarantees the reduction of fiduciary risk
which may lead to long term reputational risk
of Islamic finance. This is because the model
is in compliance with the Shari’ah in terms
of the form as well as the substance. From the
perspective of the form, this model is arguably
Shari’ah compliance based on (the consensus
of) all four school of thoughts since this model
even accommodates the most restricted mudharaba definition of Shafi’i and Maliki who
only permit the utilisation of mudharaba capital for financing of trading firm. The money
granted from mudharaba contract is supposed
to be used for acquiring the goods which in turn
should be resold (see further Hasanuz-Zaman,
1990). In addition, the uniqueness of the model,
in which the model substantially rooted in the
real sector of the economy, also fulfils the substance of Islamic finance, namely that embeddedness of the financial sector and real sector
(Iqbal, 1999).
Regulatory challenges
The main challenge for this appealing idea
comes from countries which utilise so-called
Arm’s-Length (or specialised) banking system
including Indonesia in which banks are precluded to have equity position in the firms they
serve (Boyd et al., 1998). It is the case that the
Indonesia banking law prohibits banks to conducting equity participation to the non-financial
companies. This prohibition can be found in the
Article 10, Act of The Republic Indonesia No. 7
of 1992 on Banking as Amended by Act Number 10 of 1998. The Act says the only exception
of banks equity participation are in other banks
or business operating financial services, such
as leasing, venture capital, securities house,
insurance and securities clearing house. While
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the temporary equity participation may only be
conducted by banks to settle problems of bad
debt or financing based on Shari’ah Principles
(see the same Act, Article 7).
Therefore, according to the current law the
only possibility of doing murabah comes from
the banking murabaha model in which IBs
should become the seller of the goods. However, the paradox then exists since even though
the Indonesian law literally defines murabaha
contract as a sale-based transaction (see for
example Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 9/19/
PBI/2007), it substantially places banks as
only financiers of the clients rather than sellers of the goods as shown by BI’s Circular Letter (SE) No. 10/14/DPbS, March 17th 2008. In
fact, neither conventional nor Islamic banks are
permitted to have inventory or real tradable assets in their balance sheet. Furthermore, banks
are even prohibited to possess the ownership
title of the collateral purchased by banks and
shall execute (sell) it at the latest of one-year
period, according to elucidations to the Act of
the Republic of Indonesia Number 7 of 1992
Concerning Banking, Article 12A, paragraph 1
and 2. This law implies no difference between
Indonesian murabaha banking of IBs and interest based financing of conventional banks.
The above discussions then point out that
neither the Universal model of IBs nor the ‘true’
murabaha banking model are accommodated
by current Indonesian law. In other words, the
adjustment of the law is inevitable in order to
accommodate Shari’ah-compliance mode of financing in Indonesia. It is worth to note that,
even the law makers are supporting to the clear
definition of the difference between conventional and Islamic banking. It is at least represented by the Act of the Republic of Indonesia
Number 7 of 1992 Concerning Banking, Article
12A letter c which says that Islamic Banks are
not legitimate to conducting conventional activities and vice versa. Therefore, it is plausible
if the adjustment of the law is proposed, and
thus the proposed adjustment is the one which
can accommodate the Universal IBs’ operation
in Indonesia given the limitation of murabaha
banking as discussed earlier in this study.
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Universal banking of Germany and main
banking of Japan: the benchmarks
While Universal Islamic banking system
is not compatible with Arm’s-Length banking
system, the proposed model will be best fit with
the so-called Universal Banking of Germany as
well as Main Banking of Japan. In the Universal Banking of Germany, for instance, the banks
are permitted to have the equity position along
with the loans, have voting rights and even
place their representative in the board of director of the firms they serve (see Macey and Miller, 1995; Boyd et al., 1998). While in the Main
Banking of Japan, although the post WWII regulation does not permit Japanese banks to have
equity position in the non-bank firms more than
5 per cent just akin to that in US, the development has more resembled Germany which enables the banks to establish subsidiaries which
have share in other companies and establish the
keiretsu system, in which companies are related
by mutual shareholding to each other and to a
lead bank (Benston, 1994), hence allow them
to become large and be active in corporate governance (Roe, 1993; Aoki et al., 1994).
One of the typical arguments supporting
Arm’s-Length banking system which separate
bank into commercial and investment bank is
the failure of well-known bank in 1930s the
Great Depression. At that time, the failure of
over 9,000 banks were believed driven by their
involvement in securities activities which is
the main feature of universal and main banking
system (Benston, 1994). In addition, the advocates argue that since universal banks tend to
be large, they become too big to fail and imply higher risk for the entire country’s payment
system. However, there is no clear empirical
evidences showing those statements are observable in the reality (Benston, 1994).
Through this section this study locates that
the implementation of Universal Islamic banking system by all means is possible as the model shares the feature of bank involvement in the
equity investment through either cash control
(mudharaba) or both cash and voting controls
(musharaka) with the universal banking of Germany as well as main banking of Japan. The

extensive literatures are in debate of whether
the involvement of banks into the securities
activity leads to increase of systematic risk in
the financial system. This study argues that the
term involvement in the securities activity in
the Universal Islamic banking is in a way different with that in universal banking. Universal
Islamic banking ensures the involvement in the
real sector of the economy instead of only trading in the stock market for the sake of liquidity management of the banks. Thus, it is very
much possible to observe the involvement of
the IBs into the non-listed trading companies in
the Universal Islamic banking system. Therefore, by definition the equity investment activities in this model is not merely synonymous
with gambling as noted by the founding father
of Federal Reserve system, Senator Glass (see
Benston, 1994).

Conclusions
This study aims at examining the sustainability of the Islamic Interbank Benchmark Rate
(IIBR) application as the solution for banking
murabaha pricing and proposing the more sustainable solution which emerges from the root
of the problems of IBs’ practices, particularly in
Indonesia. In doing so, first, this study utilises
the Johansen cointegration test in order to examine the long-run equilibrium relationship between ribawi benchmark rates, namely JIBOR,
and Islamic benchmark rate, IIBR. The findings
show that JIBOR and IIBR are significantly
cointegrated over majority of the maturities,
namely overnight, 1-month, 3-month, 6-month
and also 1-year. Thus, the study concludes that
the utilisation of IIBR is not sustainably cope
the problem presents in the banking murabaha
since it fails to differentiate itself with the conventional benchmarks as well as fails to re-embedding back the mode of financing with the
real sector of the economy, and hence allows
Islamic finance as a whole suffers the reputational risk.
Second, this study proposes the so called
Universal Islamic banking system as the more
sustainable solution for dealing with chronic
problems of banking murabaha, particularly
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ribawi benchmark rate pricing practice. In this
model, IB owns the share of a merchant (trader)
either using mudharaba (non-voting rights) or
musharaka (voting rights) mode of financing.
While the merchant then trades its goods on the
credit murabaha basis to the customers in the
real sector of the economy and prices it according to the both price elasticity of demand and
that of supply mechanism, instead of benchmark rate. This model allows Islamic banking
to accommodate its very nature of equity based
investment model in the practice. By using this
model, murabaha contract is utilised by the
merchants instead of banks, thus remedies some
chronic issues of banking murabaha including
the ownership and benchmark pricing problems. The model, furthermore, also promotes
the more efficient economic practice, in which
it reduces the high cost economy and promotes
the synergy between banks and merchants in
doing their business and long-term sustainability relationship between sellers (banks and
merchant) and buyers (clients). Finally, and
most importantly, this Universal Islamic banking model guarantees the reduction of long term
reputational risk of Islamic finance as the model
complies with the Shari’ah form and substance.
However, this model to be implemented certainly requires the support particularly from
the Indonesian banking law. Unfortunately,
the current law does not support this model
since banks equity participation are prohibited
except that in other banks or business operating financial services, such as leasing, venture

capital, securities house, insurance and securities clearing house. The paradox comes from
the fact that actually neither conventional nor
Shari’ah banks are permitted to have inventory
or real tradable assets in their balance sheet.
This condition implies negligence to IBs’ ownership for the assets traded in murabaha contract, and thus makes IBs have no distinction to
the conventional counterparts. Therefore, by all
means the adjustment of law is needed in order
to establish the true Shari’ah-based mode of financing, whether to accommodate the former
unsupported law or the letter one. Accordingly,
it is safe to say that the proposed adjustment
must accommodate the former one so that Universal Islamic banking system can be operated
in Indonesia, given the limitation of murabaha
banking.
Finally, this model is practically sensible.
The fact that this model is best fit with the universal banking of Germany and main banking
of Japan supports this argument. Those banking
system, notably the universal banking, permit
the involvement of bank into securities activities, one of them is trading the stock of nonfinancial firms. The Universal Islamic banking
model does not share the feature of trading the
stock for liquidity management only, which
sometimes can nearly similar with gambling;
however, it does the feature of the real acquisition in which bank truly invest their money in
the trading firms either with the cash rights only
(mudharaba) or cash and voting rights (musharaka).
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